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This paper deals with the impact of information on the decisions of an agent whose beliefs are imprecise and whose
preferences are not in accordance with the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model. We assume that his one-shot prefer-
ences are representable by a Hurwicz criterion with pessimism–optimism index a. We moreover assume that in a sequential
decision making situation the decision maker acts according to the root dictatorship version of McClennen’s Resolute
Choice model: he evaluates strategies at the root of the decision tree by the Hurwicz criterion and enforces the best strat-
egy, thus behaving in a dynamically consistent manner. The use of Resolute Choice in an imprecise probability environ-
ment raises a general question: is information processed correctly in this model? To show that this question can be given a
positive answer in standard cases (and also motivated by the accident-no accident variable in an automobile insurance con-
text), we study the basic situation in which data are provided by the random sampling of a binary variable, and ﬁnd the
inﬂuence of the pessimism–optimism index on the optimal decisions to be decreasing with the sample size, the optimal deci-
sion rule only depending, asymptotically, on the relative frequencies observed. Then, we turn to the second question raised
by the well known feature of Resolute Choice: non-consequentialism. Does the fact that the optimal decision rule may
depend on unrealized outcomes necessarily lead to criticisable choices? We study a two-period insurance problem in which
an individual has to choose his coverage at period two after observing the period one outcome (loss or no loss). It turns out
that in the case where no loss happened, a seemingly irrelevant data – the ﬁrst period deductible level – may inﬂuence the
decision maker’s second period insurance choice. We analyse this result in relation with the existence and value of the
pessimism–optimism degree.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
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is a weighted sum of its lowest possible expected value (pessimistic evaluation) and of its highest one (optimis-
tic evaluation).
It is well known that a SEU maximizer has dynamically consistent preferences: future decisions which seem
the best today will still be judged the best tomorrow; this justiﬁes the determination of the optimal strategy by
backward induction (sophisticated choice). Preferences as modelled by the Hurwicz criterion no longer verify
this consistency property. Thus, sophisticated choice no longer guarantees a rational behavior: the selected
strategy may well be dominated.
An alternative to sophisticated choice which ensures rationality is the version of McClennen’s Resolute
Choice (1990) where the best strategy at the root is continued at every node (root dictatorship). We adopt this
model here: strategies are evaluated at the root of the decision tree by the Hurwicz criterion; the enforcement
of the best strategy all along the tree automatically guarantees dynamic consistency.
The use of Resolute Choice in an imprecise probability environment raises a ﬁrst important question: is
information processed correctly in this model? The existence of phenomena such as dilation (ambiguity
increase with new information, cf. Seidenfeld and Wasserman [14]) makes the answer unclear. We provide
a positive answer in a particular case by considering a situation where data are provided by the random sam-
pling of a binary variable and decisions are bets on future values of that variable. This decision problem is
closely related to simple hypothesis testing.
Optimal decision rules turn out to be based on observed frequencies (just as likelihood ratio tests) and the
inﬂuence of the degree of pessimism fades progressively when samples become larger.
A distinctive, controversial feature of Resolute Choice is non-consequentialism: decisions may depend on
seemingly irrelevant data such as unrealized outcomes. Since this is a theoretical result, the question arises
whether this phenomenon is widespread in real world decision problems or not. As a ﬁrst ﬁeld of investigation,
we have chosen multi-period insurance contracting which constitutes an active research domain [3]. In this
domain, up to now, the environment has invariably been described as a situation of risk (subjective or frequ-
entist probabilities) and the model used is EU theory. However, for some risks, due to lacking or conﬂicting
data, this assumption is highly irrealistic which is our justiﬁcation for introducing imprecise risk in the case of
a two-period insurance problem in which an individual has to choose his coverage for the second period after
observing the ﬁrst period outcome (loss, no loss). We apply Hurwicz’s criterion together with a Resolute
Choice behavior and determine to which extent unrealized outcomes inﬂuence optimal decisions. It turns
out that such an inﬂuence indeed exists but only to a limited extent and for individuals who are neither extre-
mely pessimistic, nor extremely optimistic.2. Dynamic decision making in the framework of imprecise probabilities
2.1. Imprecise risk
When facing common, general or personal, hazards, and in particular insurable hazards, most agents do
not have a precise idea of their likelihoods. Statistics may be inexistent, unavailable or just neglected by
the agent; also, important individual variations can exist. Thus, whatever the reasons, an agent may prove
to be unable to ascribe speciﬁc probabilities to the relevant events in a signiﬁcant manner.
On the other hand, he may feel more comfortable with associating a probability interval [P(E),P+(E)] with
each event E; for instance, typical intervals would be: [0.01,0.10] for an event he considers as ‘‘very unlikely to
happen but not impossible’’; [0.10,0.30] for an event he judges ‘‘rather unlikely to happen’’; and their union
[0.01,0.30] for an event he just thinks ‘‘unlikely to happen’’.
If the agent moreover believes that there is a true probability P0 on the events (which he is just not able to
identify), this circumscribes P0 to P, a subset ofL, the set of all probabilities on the event set, for instance, to
a subset of the form P ¼ fP : for all E; P ðEÞ 2 ½PðEÞ; PþðEÞg.
Such an agent uses an imprecise probability representation of uncertainty and, accordingly, makes decisions
under imprecise risk.
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Various theories have been proposed for modelling decision making under imprecise risk. The most pop-
ular one (but not the only one, see Section 2.3.4) combines existing theories applying to the limiting cases of
risk and complete ignorance:
(i) Under risk, the standard criterion is Expected Utility (EU). A decision maker (DM), believing the true
probability to be P0, ascribes to a decision d valueUP 0ðdÞ ¼ EP0uðdÞ ¼
X
x
uðxÞP 0ðd1ðxÞÞ
i.e., the expectation of the utilities of the outcomes x that d may bring about depending on which event
d1(x) obtains.(ii) Under complete ignorance, Hurwicz’s criterion, proposed as early as 1951, ascribes to a decision d a value
which is a weighted sum of its worst and best possible outcomes, amd + (1  a)Md; parameter a being
interpreted as a degree of pessimism.
Suppose now that complete ignorance prevails in P and consider a DM for whom being only able to locate
probability P0 in a set P amounts to being uncertain about which of the values UP(d), P in P, is the correct
one. Then, this DM will look at the worse and best possible evaluations, and, according to his degree of
pessimism, will put more or less weight on the former or the later, which is expressed by the following formula:V ðdÞ ¼ a inf
P2P
EPuðdÞ þ ð1 aÞ sup
P2P
EPuðdÞ ð1ÞThis criterion being the natural generalization of the Hurwicz one to imprecise risk, we will preserve its
denomination of ‘‘Hurwicz criterion’’. In a decision making context, the interest of a preference model
depends crucially on its ability to induce economically rational behavior, which includes invulnerability to
Dutch books and money-pumps [12,2] in situations involving sequential choices. Obviously, economic ratio-
nality cannot be achieved with a criterion which does not increase with dominance – is not monotone – in some
sense.
Under suitable topological assumptions (P a compact subset of a separable space), Hurwicz’s criterion sat-
isﬁes strict and weak monotonicity properties. If the expected utility of decision d is strictly higher than that of
decision d for every probability measure, i.e., EPu(d) > EPu(d) for all P 2 P (strict pointwise dominance onP),
then infP2PEPuðdÞ > infP2PEPuðdÞ; supP2PEPuðdÞ > supP2PEPuðdÞ, and ﬁnally V(d) > V(d); moreover, the
weaker relation, EPu(d)P EPu(d) for all P 2 P, implies V(d)P V(d). In particular, if decision d performs
strictly better (resp. better) than decision d whatever happens, i.e., u(d(e)) > (P)u(d(e)) for every event e on
which both d and d are constant, then EPu(d) > (P)EPu(d) for all P 2 P, hence V(d) > (P)V(d).
On the other hand, if EPu(d)P EPu(d) for all P 2 P, with EPu(d) > EPu(d) for some P 2 P, it may still hap-
pen that nonetheless infP2PEPuðdÞ ¼ infP2PEPuðdÞ and supP2PEPuðdÞ ¼ supP2PEPuðdÞ, hence that V(d) =
V(d); in particular, u(d(e))P u(d(e)) for every e, plus u(d(e)) > u(d(e)) for some e, do not imply V(d) > V(d).
Note however that for every e > 0, V(d) > V(d  e) and V(d + e) > V(d) will hold; thus, although not mono-
tone, Hurwicz’s criterion is, in a straightforward sense, e-monotone.
These monotonicity properties are suﬃcient to make the model behave satisfactorily in one-shot decision
problems. Multiple decision situations are a diﬀerent matter, as illustrated in the following subsection.
2.3. Problems with dynamic decision making and the Resolute Choice solution
2.3.1. An illustrative example
Consider a DM who at time 1 (node A of the decision tree in Fig. 1) has to choose between two decisions,
Up1 and Down1; then, at time 2 (node B), provided he has chosen Up1 and event E obtains, he has again a
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Fig. 1. Dynamically inconsistent preferences.
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c and H or
Hc; if at time 1 he has chosen Up1 and event E
c obtains, or has chosen Down1, there is no other choice to make.
Gains are indicated next to the corresponding leaves of the tree.
The DM’s criterion is Hurwicz’s, with the same parameters u and a, at both decision nodes, A and B. For
the sake of simplicity we assume a = 1/2, risk-neutrality (u(x) = 2x for all x), and complete ignorance on the
algebra of events generated by E, G and H; thus, P ¼L and a strategy (at A), as well as a substrategy (at B),
d, giving outcomes d(e) on events e has value V(d) = infed(e) + suped(e).
At node A, the values of the three available strategies, (Up1,Up2), (Up1,Down2), and Down1 ((Up1,Up2)
means Up1 at node A; then Up2 at node B if E happens, etc.) are, respectively, V(Up1,Up2) = 20;
V(Up1,Down2) = 25; V(Down1) = 0; thus the DM prefers (Up1,Down2) to (Up1,Up2) (and to Down1) in A.
However, at node B he prefers substrategy (decision) Up2 to substrategy Down2 since V(Up2) = 30 >
V(Down2) = 25; thus, if he takes decision Up1 in A and event E happens, then, once arrived in B, he no longer
considers Down2 to be the best feasible action; his preferences are not dynamically consistent.
2.3.2. Resolute Choice
What are the decisions actually made by a DM with a logical mind, who is able to anticipate on his future
actions (sophistication, as opposed to myopia), and is aware that his preferences are not dynamically consis-
tent? Roughly, one can think of two diﬀerent patterns of behavior:
(i) If his future choices are always dictated by his future preferences, then the DM should use backward
induction in the decision tree: at each given decision node, knowing which substrategies would be trig-
gered by each of his feasible actions, he can evaluate and compare them, according to his criterion,
and choose the best available action. Coping locally in that way with his preferential inconsistencies
unfortunately does not warrant him at the end (when arrived at the root of the tree) the selection of
a strategy possessing a valuable global property. Indeed, going back to the example, the DM would
be willing to pay up to ﬁve units to have the tree pruned and edge Up2 suppressed in B. Consider then
the augmented tree in which a new subtree oﬀers this possibility to the DM; strategy (Up1,Down2), which
is still materially feasible, clearly strictly dominates the additional strategy, which is nonetheless chosen
by the backward induction procedure. In general, the use of that behavioral procedure is always a poten-
tial source of unnecessary waste: it is not economically rational.How can any waste be avoided? There is
a straightforward way:
(ii) If the strategy which is judged best according to preferences at the root node is actually played, then, the
criterion being used only once as in one-shot decision problems, the monotonicity of Hurwicz’s criterion
guarantees economic rationality. These root-dictatorship preferences mean of course that future choices
do not have to bear any relation with future preferences. More generally and less drastically, Resolute
Choice [9, p. 260] only requires the achievement of a compromise strategy reﬂecting both present and
future preferences; in McClennen’s terms: ‘‘the theory of resolute choice is predicated on the notion that
the single agent who is faced with making decisions over time can achieve a cooperative arrangement
between his present self and his relevant future selves that satisﬁes the principle of intrapersonal optimal-
ity’’. Resolute Choice is not just a theoretical construct; it can be implemented in an operational way (see
[6]).
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terion, which automatically makes preferences dynamically consistent, so that backward induction can be used
to ﬁnd the optimal strategy (see, e.g. [10]).
2.3.3. Non-consequentialism and unrealized outcomes
A particular feature of Resolute Choice is non-consequentialism: the choice at a given decision node,
being induced by a strategy which depends on all the data in the decision tree, may in particular depend
on those data which are outside the subtree rooted at that node; these elements are known as unrealized
outcomes.
In Fig. 1 example, if the best strategy in A, (Up1,Down2), can be imposed, Down2 is played in B. Modify
now a single outcome, at the leaf following Up1 and E
c, by changing 0 into 10; the best strategy in A is
now (Up1,Up2) and Up2 is played in B accordingly; thus the action taken in B depends on a unrealized out-
come, the outcome at a leaf that is not part of the subtree rooted at B.
For an illuminating discussion of consequentialism, see [10]. Let us just note for the moment that, since, as
seen above, economic rationality cannot provide arguments against non-consequentialism, any defense of con-
sequentialism must rely on a diﬀerent conception of rationality.2.3.4. Alternative approaches
Resolute Choice should not be confused with a diﬀerent non-consequentialist approach to dynamic deci-
sion making, which has recourse to recursive models (see e.g. [4]); such models are straightforwardly dynam-
ically consistent and backward induction remains valid; on the other hand, economic rationality is not
necessarily satisﬁed. Neither is it in the non-consequentialist approach, preserving a weak form of dynamic
consistency of Hanany and Klibanoﬀ [5].
Another approach to dynamic decision making under uncertainty, called E-admissibility, has been sug-
gested by Levi [8] and discussed by Seidenfeld [13]. It works by ﬁrst selecting all the last stage Bayes rules
and then moving backwards repeating this selection stage by stage. In order to uniquely select a strategy in
the remaining set, a secondary criterion, applied at the root node, is used. While more discriminating than
Resolute Choice with root dictatorship, E-admissibility (with a suitable secondary criterion) still guarantees
normative qualities such as non-negative value of information.
Note that E-admissibility is a non-consequentialist solution in general. However, de Cooman and Troﬀaes
[1] prove the validity of dynamic programming (which amounts to consequentialism) in the particular case of
sequential decision making in the absence of conditional decisions.3. Learning with Resolute Choice
An urn contains red and black balls; the proportion of red balls is either p or p+, where 0 < p < p+ < 1.
The DM is told that: n + 1 balls are going to be drawn one by one from the urn, with replacement; that he can
make bets on the color of the (n + 1)th being red; and that his decision of betting or not can be conditioned on
the outcome of the n ﬁrst draws. When betting, his stake is m and he will receive gainM if the (n + 1)th is red.
We assume p < mM < p
þ.
The DM conditions his bets on the outcomes of the n ﬁrst draws by just specifying a betting rule
Kn  {0,1, . . .,n}, ‘‘k 2 Kn’’ meaning: ‘‘if k balls among the n ﬁrst drawn are red, bet (on red) at the
(n + 1)th draw’’.
One denotes kn ¼ mink2Knk.
The DM uses the Hurwicz criterion, is risk-neutral (u(x) = x) and is resolute; he chooses his betting rule
when learning the sample size n and before the observations begin.
We are interested in the evolution of the optimal betting rule when n tends to inﬁnity.
A betting behavior is a sequence ðKnÞn2N. Betting behavior ðKnÞn2N weakly dominates betting behavior
K 0n
 
n2N if for all n 2 N, V ðKnÞP V K 0n
 
; if, moreover, V ðKnÞ > V K 0n
 
for some value of n 2 N, then
ðKnÞn2N dominates K 0n
 
n2N. A betting behavior which is not dominated by any other is admissible. A betting
behavior which weakly dominates all the others is optimal.
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Kn = {kn,kn + 1, . . .,n} (i.e., betting if and only if at least kn red balls have been drawn).
Lemma 1. For a fixed n, let betting rules Kn and K 0n only differ in the case where k red balls are drawn: k 2 Kn;
K 0n ¼ Kn n fkg; thenV ðKnÞ > ½¼V K 0n
 () k
n
> ½¼Lþ 1
n
R
with L ¼
ln
1 p
1 pþ
ln
pþð1 pÞ
ð1 pþÞp
and R ¼
ln
a
1 a
m pM
pþM  m
 
ln
pþð1 pÞ
ð1 pþÞp
:Proof. Let f ðp; n; kÞ ¼ n
k
 
ðpÞkð1 pÞnk½pM  mV ðKnÞ ¼ a inf
p2fp ;pþg
X
k2Kn
f ðp; n; kÞ þ ð1 aÞ sup
p2fp ;pþg
X
k2Kn
f ðp; n; kÞSince it is assumed that p < mM < p
þ; pþM  m > 0 and pM  m < 0.
Thus, infp2fp;pþg f ðp; n; kÞ ¼ f ðp; n; kÞ and supp2fp;pþgf ðp; n; kÞ ¼ f ðpþ; n; kÞ.
Consequently,
V ðKnÞ  V K 0n
  ¼ a n
k
 
ðpÞkð1 pÞnk½pM  m þ ð1 aÞ n
k
 
ðpþÞkð1 pþÞnk½pþM  m, which
implies that:V ðKnÞ > ½¼V K 0n
  ð2Þ
() p
þ
1 pþ 
1 p
p
 k
 1 p
þ
1 p
 n
> ½¼ a
1 a
m pM
pþM  m ð3Þ
() k
n
ln
pþð1 pÞ
ð1 pþÞp  ln
1 p
1 pþ > ½¼
1
n
ln
a
1 a
m pM
pþM  m
 
ð4Þ
() k
n
> ½¼
ln 1p

1pþ
ln
pþð1 pÞ
ð1 pþÞp
þ 1
n
ln
a
1 a
m pM
pþM  m
 
ln
pþð1 pÞ
ð1 pþÞp
:  ð5ÞThe following proposition is a direct application of Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. Consider betting behavior ðKnÞn2N, and let kn ¼ mink2Knk.
A necessary condition for the admissibility of ðKnÞn2N is thatkn
n
!n!1Lwith L defined in Lemma 1.
Proof. For every n, associate with Kn betting rules K
0
n ¼ Kn n fkng and K 00n ¼ Kn [ fkn  1g:
(i) According to Lemma 1,V ðKnÞP V K 0n
 () kn
n
 LP 1
n
R:(ii) By the same lemma,V ðKnÞP V K 00n
 () kn  1
n
 L 6 1
n
R:
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converge towards L, there is no N such that double inequality 1n ðRþ 1ÞP knn  LP 1n R is satisﬁed for all
nP N, and therefore either V ðKnÞP V K 00n
 
or V ðKnÞP V K 0n
 
has to be violated an inﬁnity of times; one
can thus deﬁne a betting behavior Kn
 
n2N, with K

n ¼ argmax V ðKÞ : K 2 Kn;K 0n;K 00n
 	 	
, hence such that
V Kn
 
P V ðKnÞ, for every n, and moreover that V Kn
 
> V ðKnÞ for an inﬁnity of values of n; but this means
that Kn
 
n2N dominates ðKnÞn2N. h
Proposition 2. The consistent betting behavior, Kn
 
n2N where K

n ¼ kn; kn þ 1; kn þ 2; . . . ; n
 	
, and for each n, kn
is the smallest integer such thatkn
n
P Lþ 1
n
R;with L and R defined in Lemma 1 is an optimal betting behavior.
Proof. Let ðKnÞn2N be any other betting behavior. For ﬁxed n and every k 6 n, let vðkÞ ¼ a
n
k
 
ðpÞk
ð1 pÞnk½pM  m þ ð1 aÞ n
k
 
ðpþÞkð1 pþÞnk½pþM  m; thus  X XV Kn  V ðKnÞ ¼
k2KnnKn
vðkÞ 
k2KnnKn
vðkÞ:Since k 2 Kn n Kn ) knP k

n
n P Lþ 1n R and k 2 Kn n Kn ) kn < k

n
n ) kn < Lþ 1n R, it results from the lemma
that
P
k2KnnKnvðkÞP 0 and
P
k2KnnKnvðkÞ 6 0. h
Note that expression p
þ
1pþ  1p

p
h ik
 1pþ
1p
h in
on the l.h.s. of inequality (3) in the proof of Lemma 1 is a like-
lihood ratio; in fact the monotonicity properties of the Hurwicz criterion make likelihood ratio (possibly ran-
dom) tests an admissible family as in the standard statistical decision theory (Neyman–Pearson lemma). For
related results concerning hypothesis testing with imprecise probabilities on the parameter space, see [7].
Note also that expression R, deﬁned in Lemma 1, has a strong similarity with the term that would appear in
a Bayesian model, which is
ln p1p
mpM
pþMm
h i
ln
pþð1pÞ
ð1pþÞp
, with p the prior probability of p being the true proportion of red
balls.
Let us ﬁnally emphasize the fact that, although all betting decisions are made only on the basis of a single
ex ante evaluation, data are taken into account in a sensible way: for high values of n, the DM acts as if he
used relative frequencies as estimators of probabilities; however, for smaller n, the degree of pessimism has
some inﬂuence on the bets through the term R.
4. An application of Resolute Choice to two-period insurance demand
In this section, we study a two-period insurance problem in which an individual has to choose his coverage
at period 2 after observing the period 1 outcome (a loss occurred or not).
An individual with initial wealth W faces a risk with a unique amount of potential loss L <W. This situ-
ation can be represented by a random variable X: if E is the event loss (occurs) and Ec the event no loss,
X(x) = L for x 2 E and X(x) = 0 for x 2 Ec. The individual’s information and/or beliefs allow him to assert
that the probability of loss occurrence during a year is between p and p+. The set of probability distributions
which are consistent with the available information is:P ¼ fP 2L : P ðEÞ 2 ½p; pþg ð6Þwhere L denotes the set of all probability distributions on the relevant support.
Two periods of time are considered: in the ﬁrst period, the individual has no insurance choice to make; for
instance, he rents a car, and an insurance coverage with a deductible K 6 L is automatically included in the
contract. In the second period however, the individual has to decide if he will subscribe an insurance contract
or not, for instance he will buy a car and has to decide whether or not he will take a theft insurance (which is
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the premium is P < L.
We assume that the individual needs to decide immediately, at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, what his
insurance policy will be; the reason may be, for instance, that he still has then other opportunities beside rent-
ing-then-buying a car and that their comparisons require accurate evaluations, or that he has to plan out his
expenses in advance.
Individual preferences are represented by the Hurwicz criterion: a decision d : X! R is evaluated by func-
tional V of formula (1) where u is a strictly increasing function.
In the simpler, one period situation, where there is no previous experience of loss, the set of strategies D
contains only two elements, denoted: d, the individual subscribes an insurance contract, and d, the individual
does not buy any insurance. According to (1), these decisions have the following values:V ðdÞ ¼ uðW PÞ
V ðdÞ ¼ ðapþ þ ð1 aÞpÞuðW  LÞ þ ð1 apþ  ð1 aÞpÞuðW Þand the decision to buy coverage depends on the pessimism–optimism index a and on the information preci-
sion in the following way:V ðdÞP V ðdÞ () aðpþ  pÞP uðW Þ  uðW PÞ
uðW Þ  uðW  LÞ  p
:Thus, a higher degree of pessimism and a greater imprecision both act in favor of the decision to buy insurance
coverage.
4.1. Decisions evaluation
We now turn to the evaluation of the decisions of an individual who acquires additional information related
to a period one potential loss. His decisions can then be conditioned on the realization of the loss in the ﬁrst
period. Our goal is to determine the inﬂuence of the ﬁrst period loss realization on the second period decision
as well as the impact of a on that decision. We further assume probabilistic independence of the successive
events, i.e., that for any given probability p 2 [0,1], with Ei denoting the event ‘‘loss in period i’’, if
P(E1) = p then P(E2|E1) = p as well, hence P(E2) = p and P(E1 \ E2) = p2.
A strategy is now characterized by a pair of decisions: the ﬁrst one conditional on the realization of E1, and
the second one on the realization of Ec1. The set of possible strategies D consists then in four pairs of decisions:
D ¼ fdd; dd; dd; ddg, where dd ¼ fd if E1; d if Ec1g, dd ¼ fd if E1; d if Ec1g; . . . The decision tree correspond-
ing to this problem is given in Fig. 2.
The evaluations of the strategies at the beginning of period one by the Hurwicz criterion are given in the
following proposition. This evaluation requires the determination of the probabilities in [p,p+] at which the
lowest and highest expected utility are achieved. It turns out that these probabilities may well diﬀer from p+
and p and depend on the strategy.W  –L
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Fig. 2. Insurance demand tree.
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• uðW  L KÞ 6 1
2p ½uðW PÞ þ ð2p  1ÞuðW  KÞ,
• p ¼ 1
2
þ uðW ÞuðWPKÞ
2½uðW ÞuðWLÞ verifies p
* 2 [p, p+] and p > 1
2
ðp þ pþÞ,
then the available decisions are evaluated as follows:V ðddÞ ¼ Aðpþ; pÞuðW P KÞ þ ð1 Aðpþ; pÞÞuðW PÞ;
V ðddÞ ¼ Aðp; pÞuðW P KÞ þ Bðp; pÞuðW  LÞ þ Cð1 p; 1 pÞuðW Þ;
V ðddÞ ¼ Cðpþ; pÞuðW  L KÞ þ Bðpþ; pÞuðW  KÞ þ Að1 pþ; 1 pÞuðW PÞ;
V ðddÞ ¼ Cðpþ; pÞuðW  L KÞ þ Bðpþ; pÞðuðW  KÞ þ uðW  LÞÞ þ Cð1 pþ; 1 pÞuðW Þ;whereAðp; qÞ ¼ ap þ ð1 aÞq; Bðp; qÞ ¼ apð1 pÞ þ ð1 aÞqð1 qÞ; Cðp; qÞ ¼ ap2 þ ð1 aÞq2:Proof. See Appendix. h
In very ambiguous situations, the requirements above are not too restrictive; for instance, in the limiting
case of complete ignorance, that is, for [p,p+] = [0,1], these conditions reduce to P > K.
From now on, we assume that these conditions are satisﬁed.
Note that the pessimistic evaluation of strategy dd is not achieved at the upper probability bound p+: with
p* smaller than p+ but close to it, the advantage of incurring period 1 loss K with the smaller probability p* is
not compensated by the disadvantage of incurring period 2 loss L with probability (1  p*)p* greater than
(1  p+)p+.
Let us now turn to a speciﬁc feature of the model: the relevance of unrealized outcomes.
Consider strategies dd and dd. They diﬀer by the decision that follows the period 1 no loss event. The util-
ities involved in the direct comparison of these conditional decisions do not depend on K, and its value would
be irrelevant in a consequentialist approach. However, with our criterion,V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ ¼ aðpþ  pÞuðW P KÞ þ ð1 aÞpþ  ð1 aÞpuðW PÞ  ðapð1 pÞ
þ ð1 aÞpð1 pÞÞuðW  LÞ  ðað1 pÞ2 þ ð1 aÞð1 pÞ2ÞuðW Þ:The sign of the previous expression is indeterminate and depends on the value of K, which inﬂuences both
the lowest utility u(W  P  K) and p*. More precisely, the inﬂuence of K on the discrepancy between V(dd)
and V ðddÞ increases with the pessimism–optimism index a, sinced½V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ
dK
¼ a  dp

dK
uðW P KÞ  ðpþ  pÞu0ðW P KÞ


þð2p  1Þ dp

dK
uðW  LÞ þ 2ð1 pÞ dp

dK
uðW Þ
The reason why the comparison of V(dd) and V ðddÞ depends on the irrelevant outcome K is that the Hurwicz
criterion is a limiting form of a rank dependent utility (RDU) criterion and that in RDU theory [11] the deci-
sion weight associated with a consequence depends on the rank of this consequence in the set of consequences
of a given decision. Decisions dd and dd have W  P  K as a common consequence but while with dd,
W  P  K is the worst consequence, this is no longer the case with dd for which it is W  L. Consequently,
the decision weight of u(W  P  K) is not the same in the evaluation of dd and dd, even if this consequence is
obtained for the same event (E1) with both decisions. Thus, the second period preference between insurance or
not in the case where no loss occurred in the ﬁrst period may depend on the deductible level which the indi-
vidual would have paid had loss occurred.
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The following example illustrates the impact of K on the optimal strategy.1
We consider an individual with initial wealth W = 1,000,000 who faces the risk of a loss of amount
L = 40,000. Loss probability at each period, p, belongs to [0.01,0.7]. The insurance premium for full coverage
isP = 4000. The utility function is assumed to be in the CRRA class (with constant relative risk aversion) that
is uðxÞ ¼ x1R
1R; here, we take R = 2.
The sign of V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ depends on a and K as follows:
• For a 2 ½0; 0:22½; V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ < 0 for any K 2 [0, 40,000].
• For a 2 [0.22,0.29[, there exist K* < 40,000 such that V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ 6 0 for K 6 K* and
V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ > 0 for K > K*.
• For a 2 [0.29,0.33[, there exist K* and K** with 0 < K* < K** < 40,000 such that V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ < 0 for
K* < K < K** and V ðddÞ  V ðddÞP 0 for K 6 K* and KP K**.
• For a 2 ½0:33; 1; V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ > 0 for any K 2 [0, 40,000].
Fig. 3 gives the variation of DV ¼ V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ with respect to K for a = 0.31, in this case K* = 4570 and
K** = 20,095.3.
Let us now study the dependence of the optimal strategy on K and a:
• We start by comparing dd and dd: V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ is a linear function of a. Moreover,
For a = 0, as well as for a = 1, V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ > 0 for any K 2 [0,40,000]; thus, for any a 2 [0,1], dd is pre-
ferred to dd.
• The same result is obtained for dd when compared with dd.
• The choice between dd and dd depends on a in the following way:1 NuV ðddÞ  V ðddÞ < 0 for a 2 ½0; 0:003½;
V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ > 0 for a 2 ½0:003; 1:Thus, for any K 2 [0,40,000], strategies dd and dd are dominated so that, the best strategy is always either
dd or dd.
This dominance is due to the low insurance premiumP that corresponds here to a probability estimation of
0.1. In consequence, individuals prefer either to fully insure in any case (if they are pessimistic enough) and
thus beneﬁt from the low premium, or to adapt their decision to the observed loss. Fig. 4 shows the optimal
strategy as a function of K and a. It appears that the optimal decision results from a trade-oﬀ between the
attractivity of low price insurance and that of information depending decisions. For strong optimists, the
information eﬀect dominates, whereas for strong pessimists, the full coverage eﬀect dominates. For interme-
diate values of a however, the deductible value K may inﬂuence choice: a high value of K can even inﬂuence all
decisions by lowering the individual’s expected wealth perspectives and acting in favor of full coverage.
4.3. Optimal strategy for risk-neutral individuals
To emphasize the impact of the pessimism index a on the optimal insurance strategies, we now consider the
case when u(x) = x. This allows us to isolate the inﬂuence of the ambiguity attitude, characterized here by a,
from that of the risk attitude, characterized by u.
Proposition 4. Consider a two-period insurance problem, where the individual’s imprecise information on the loss
probability is given by an interval [p, p+] with p < 12 < p
þ and the insurance premium P for full coverage is
such that P 2 [pL,p+L]. The preferences of the individual are characterized by the Hurwicz criterion with
u(x) = x. Then, he orders the different available strategies in the following way:merical results are obtained with Mathematica 4.1.
K1
40000
0.22 0.29 0.
dd
dd dd dd
dd
dd
dd
α33
Fig. 4. Choice dependence on K and a.
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Fig. 3. Choice dependence on K for a = 0.31.
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• dd%dd () aP a with a ¼ ðP p
LÞ
ðpþ  pÞL where a
* < 1;
• if K = 0, dd%dd () aP a with a ¼ ð1 p
ÞðP pLÞ
ðp  pÞðP pLþ Lð1 pÞÞ where a
** < 1;if K > 0, both dd%dd
and dd%dd are possibly depending on the value of K.
• dd%dd () aP a with a ¼ p
ðP pLÞ
ðpþ  pÞðK þ LÞ þ ðp  pÞ½Lðp þ pÞ P where a
*** < 1.
Proof. See Appendix. h
This proposition allows to determine, for K = 0 the impact of the pessimism index on the individual’s opti-
mal strategy. More precisely, in this case, a*** < a* < a** and dd is the optimal strategy for a 2 ½0; a½; dd is
the optimal strategy for a 2 ]a***,a**[ and dd is the optimal strategy for a 2 ]a**,1]. For a = a***, the individual
is indiﬀerent between dd and dd, and for a = a**, he is indiﬀerent between dd and dd.
To sum up, in this model, neither a very optimistic individual (a close to 0) nor a very pessimistic one (a
close to 1) takes advantage of the information: his decisions do not depend on his period 1 observation.
The reason is that, strong pessimists are trying above all to avoid the worst possible consequences, which
are here W  L  K if E1 and W  L if Ec1; choosing dd is the strategy that makes it possible. The opposite
is true for strong optimists: they will prefer the decisions that allow the higher possible consequences, which
are here W  K if E1 and W if Ec1.
For moderate individuals, choice is less straightforward: for them, it is valuable both to avoidW  L  K if
E1 (which however means renouncing to get W  K) and to preserve the possibility to obtain W if Ec1 (which
128 J.-Y. Jaﬀray, M. Jeleva / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 49 (2008) 117–129however means risking to get W  L); this is only possible with dd, and trade-oﬀs, which depend on all the
parameters (in particular on P), may favor this strategy.5. Conclusion
The preceding results demonstrate the operational tractability of the Resolute Choice dynamic adaptation
of the Hurwicz criterion for decision making under imprecise risk. This model is able to process information
correctly; in particular, for large samples, choices made show that the true probabilities are learned correctly
although implicitly.
In the regarded models, the puzzling inﬂuence of unrealized outcomes appears as rather limited (in the
insurance example it only concerns individuals whose pessimism index belongs to a small range). Moreover,
when this inﬂuence exists it does not seem to lead to counter-intuitive decisions.
Non-consequentialist approaches oﬀer interesting new prospects to decision aiding in dynamic frameworks.
Our preliminary ﬁndings plead for further investigation of properties and applicability of non-consequentialist
models.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3
• Decision ddV ðddÞ ¼ a inf
p2½p ;pþ
f ðpÞ þ ð1 aÞ sup
p2½p ;pþ
f ðpÞ
with f(p) = pu(W  P  K) + (1  p)u(W  P).
We have f 0(p) < 0 for any p 2 [p,p+] and any K > 0, which implies:
V ðddÞ ¼ ðapþ þ ð1 aÞpÞuðW P KÞ þ ð1 apþ  ð1 aÞpÞuðW PÞ:
• Decision ddV ðddÞ ¼ a inf
p2½p ;pþ
gðpÞ þ ð1 aÞ sup
p2½p;pþ
gðpÞ
with g(p) = pu(W  P  K) + p(1  p)u(W  L) + (1  p)2u(W).
We have g 0(p) < 0 for p < p* and g 0(p)P 0 for pP p* with p ¼ 1
2
þ uðW ÞuðWPKÞ
2½uðW ÞuðWLÞ .
V ðddÞ thus depends on the localization of p and p+ with respect to p*. If p* 2 [p,p+] (which holds if infor-
mation imprecision is suﬃciently high) and if g(p) > g(p+) (which holds if p+ is not too close to 1 or if p is
not too far from 0), infp2½p;pþ gðpÞ ¼ gðpÞ and supp2½p ;pþgðpÞ ¼ gðpÞ and thus
V ðddÞ ¼ ðap þ ð1 aÞpÞuðW P KÞ þ ðapð1 pÞ þ ð1 aÞpð1 pÞÞuðW  LÞ þ ðað1 pÞ2
þ ð1 aÞð1 pÞ2ÞuðW Þ:
• Decision ddV ðddÞ ¼ a inf
p2½p ;pþ
hðpÞ þ ð1 aÞ sup
p2½p ;pþ
hðpÞ
with h(p) = p2u(W  L  K) + p(1  p)u(W  K) + (1  p)u(W  P).
We have h 0(p) > 0 for p < p** and h 0(p) 6 0 for pP p**.
With p ¼ uðWPÞuðWKÞ
2½uðWLKÞuðWKÞ < p
 for uðW  L KÞ 6 1
2p ½uðW PÞ þ ð2p  1ÞuðW  KÞ.
Under this assumption, infp2½p;pþ hðpÞ ¼ hðpþÞ and supp2½p;pþhðpÞ ¼ hðpÞ, hence,
V ðddÞ ¼ ðaðpþÞ2 þ ð1 aÞðpÞ2ÞuðW  L KÞ þ ðapþð1 pþÞ þ ð1 aÞpð1 pÞÞuðW  KÞ
þ ðað1 pþÞ þ ð1 aÞð1 pÞÞuðW PÞ:
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p2½p ;pþ
jðpÞ þ ð1 aÞ sup
p2½p;pþ
jðpÞ
with j(p) = p2u(W  L  K) + p(1  p)(u(W  K) + u(W  L)) + (1  p)2u(W).
We have j 0(p) > 0 for p < p*** and j 0(p) 6 0 for pP p*** with p ¼ 2uðW ÞuðWKÞuðWLÞ
2½uðWLKÞuðWKÞuðWLÞuðW Þ < 0.
This implies that infp2½p ;pþ jðpÞ ¼ jðpþÞ and supp2½p;pþjðpÞ ¼ jðpÞ, thus,
V ðddÞ ¼ ðaðpþÞ2 þ ð1 aÞðpÞ2ÞuðW  L KÞ þ ðapþð1 pþÞ þ ð1 aÞpð1 pÞÞðuðW  KÞ
þ uðW  LÞÞ þ ðað1 pþÞ2 þ ð1 aÞð1 pÞ2ÞuðW Þ: Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove the results, we ﬁrst note that V(s), as well as V(s)  V(s 0) are linear functions
of a for any s; s0 2 fdd; dd; dd; ddg. Then, if for a = 0 and 1, V(s)  V(s 0) > 0 then V(s)  V(s 0) > 0 for any
a 2 [0, 1]. Else, there exist an interval for a in which V(s)  V(s 0) < 0. To determine the sign of V(s)  V(s 0), we
ﬁrst check the ﬁrst property and, if it is false, we determine the interval in which V(s)  V(s 0) < 0:
• V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ ¼ Aaþ ðP pLÞð1 2pÞ for a ¼ 0; V ðddÞ  V ðddÞP 0 ifPP pL; for a ¼ 1; V ðddÞ
V ðddÞP 0 if P 6 p+L.
Therefore, V ðddÞ  V ðddÞP 0 for any a 2 [0,1] if P 2 [pL,p+L].
• V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ ¼ aðpþ  pÞLþ pLPP 0() aP a with a ¼ ðPpLÞðpþpÞL.
• V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ ¼ a½ðp  pÞðLþPÞ þ LððpÞ2  ðpÞ2Þ  Kðpþ  pÞ þ ð1 pÞðLp PÞ for a ¼ 0;
V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ ¼ ð1 pÞðLp PÞ < 0; for a ¼ 1; V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ ¼ ð1 pÞðLp PÞ  Kðpþ  pÞ >
0 for K = 0 and indeterminate for K > 0.
• V ðddÞ  V ðddÞ ¼ a½ðpþ  pÞðK þ LÞ þ ðp  pÞðLðp þ pÞ PÞ  pðpLPÞ, for any L, K and
P 2 [pL,p+L], P < p*L and thus (p+  p*)(K + L) + (p*  p)(L(p* + p)  P) > 0 and a ¼
pðPpLÞ
ðpþpÞðKþLÞþðppÞ½LðpþpÞP < 1. hReferences
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